In contrast to the existing literature on repeated games that assumes a Þxed discount factor, I study an environment in which it is more realistic to assume a ßuctuating discount factor. In a repeated oligopoly, as the interest rate changes, so too does the degree to which Þrms discount the future. I characterize the optimal tacit collusion equilibrium when the discount factor changes over time, under both price and quantity competition, and I show that collusive prices and proÞts depend not only on the level of the discount factor but also on its volatility. Collusive prices and proÞts increase with a higher discount factor level, but decrease with its volatility. These results have important implications not only for the study of cooperation in repeated games but also for empirical studies of collusive pricing and the role that collusive pricing may play in economic cycles.
Introduction
It is well known that oligopolies can use the threat of future price wars to sustain prices above competitive levels if Þrms care enough about the future (Friedman [11] ). The extent to which Þrms care about the future depends primarily on the interest rate if the Þrms' objective is to maximize the present value of proÞts. The Þrms' discount factor may also depend on other (secondary) forces such as the probability that the product may become obsolete. Given that the interest rate and other variables that affect the discount factor are constantly changing, it is important to study tacit collusion under discount factor ßuctuations.
I characterize collusive prices and proÞts when the discount factor changes over time, under both price and quantity competition, and I show that collusive prices and proÞts increase with both present and future levels of the discount factor, but decrease with its volatility. These results have important implications not only for the study of collusion but also for repeated game theory in general.
Repeated game theory has until now largely considered the discount factor as a Þxed preference parameter 1 . Oligopoly games are one example among many of an environment in which it is natural to assume that the discount factor changes over time.
Another example would be exogenous changes in the probability that a partnership might end. Thus, the volatility of the discount factor may be an important determinant of cooperation for many kinds of repeated games, not just oligopoly.
With respect to the study of collusion, previous literature has looked at the effect of demand ßuctuations on prices, but not discount factor ßuctuations. In a seminal paper, Rotemberg and Saloner [22] show that collusive prices may be countercyclical. In this paper, I not only introduce the role of volatility to the repeated game theory literature but I also show that under discount factor ßuctuations the results are less ambiguous and more robust than under demand ßuctuations. This paper also presents several new comparative static results that can be used in empirical studies of collusive pricing. In addition, this paper underscores the role of interest rates and imperfect competition in aggregate ßuctuations. Any change in policy, technology or preferences that affects the real interest rate (either in level or volatility) may have an impact on aggregate production through changes in collusive behavior.
The environments I study and the speciÞc results I Þnd are as follows. I consider
Þrst the case in which the discount factor, identical for all Þrms, is randomly and independently drawn every period. I characterize the maximum symmetric tacit collusion prices and proÞts that can be supported in an environment in which Þrms are identical and they compete repeatedly on either price or quantity. The three main results derived from this characterization, with the third one the most interesting, are as follows.
First, the higher the discount factor in a given period, the higher the collusive prices and proÞts that can be supported in equilibrium in that period. The intuition behind this is straightforward: the higher the discount factor, the stronger the threat of future price wars and the higher prices and proÞts can be without Þrms deviating.
Second, the greater the probability of high discount factors, the higher the collusive prices and proÞts that can be supported in equilibrium. Again the intuition is straightforward. From the Þrst result we know that the higher the realization of the discount factor, the higher collusive prices and proÞts will be. Hence, a shift in the distribution function to higher discount factors would result in an increase in the expected value of collusive proÞts and an increase in the threat of future punishment, allowing higher equilibrium prices and proÞts.
Third and more interestingly, I show that the higher the volatility of the discount factor, the lower the collusive prices and proÞts that can be supported in equilibrium.
The reason for this is twofold. First, given that the combination of the incentive compatibility and feasibility constraint results in a concave collusive proÞt function (as a function of the discount factor), an increase in volatility leads to a decrease in expected proÞts. Second, this decrease in expected proÞts reduces the size of future punishment and hence results in a decrease in equilibrium proÞts and prices. This volatility effect is not secondary to the Þrst two level effects. I show that it plays an important role in determining collusive prices and proÞts.
It is important to note that allowing for the more realistic case of positively correlated discount factors will not affect the main results per se, given that both a high discount factor today and in the future make it easy to support collusion.
Two other results of this paper are worth noting. First, I show that under quantity competition the optimal symmetric punishment has a simple stick-and-carrot characterization (the punishment takes only one period and is as big as possible in equilibrium),
extending the results of Abreu [1] from the Þxed discount factor case.
Second, I show that under price competition an increase in the number of Þrms reduces collusive prices and proÞts. The reason is that the greater the number of Þrms the greater the share of the market that can be captured by a deviation, and, hence, the lower equilibrium proÞts and prices must be to avoid deviations. In the case of quantity competition, more work is needed to assess the validity of this result, since not only do the incentives to deviate change with the number of Þrms, but so may the threat of future punishment. 2 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I relate this paper to the previous literature. In Sections 3 and 4, I study optimal tacit collusion under price and quantity competition, respectively. In Section 5, I analyze some extensions to the basic model. In Section 6, I conclude. 2 To my knowledge, the effect of the number of Þrms on tacit collusive prices under quantity competition remains to be solved also for the case of Þxed discount factors.
Related literature
The related literature falls into six categories: 1) studies of the effects of demand ßuctu-ations on optimal tacit collusion, 2) customer markets and oligopolistic pricing, 3) empirical studies of collusive pricing, 4) studies of the role of oligopolies in macroeconomic ßuctuations, 5) studies of optimal punishment schemes under quantity competition, and 6) repeated games with Þxed discount factors.
Demand ßuctuations and optimal tacit collusion: The well known paper by Rotemberg and Saloner [22] offers interesting results with respect to tacit collusion that also follow from changes in the relative importance of present and future proÞts. In their paper, however, those changes are driven by changes in demand, not the discount factor.
This difference in the source of the changes in the relative importance of future and present proÞts is not trivial and leads to signiÞcantly different results.
First, in this paper an increase in the discount factor always has a nonnegative effect on the equilibrium price, while in Rotemberg and Saloner [22] an increase in demand may result in either an increase or a decrease in price. In their model, the threat of a future price war, which depends on the expectation of future equilibrium proÞts, results in an upper bound to equilibrium collusive proÞts. Hence, at this upper bound on proÞts, increases in demand do not result in increases in proÞts but a decrease in prices.
If instead the demand is so low that the upper bound to proÞts is not binding, a small increase in demand will result in an increase in prices. In addition, contrary to discount factor ßuctuations, the effect of demand ßuctuations on prices may not be robust to assuming quantity competition instead of price competition, as Rotemberg and Saloner [22] note, or to the existence of capacity constraints, as Staiger and Wolak [26] note.
Second, while in this paper an increase in the volatility of the discount factor always results in a decrease in proÞts and prices, in Rotemberg and Saloner's model an increase in the volatility of demand is again ambiguous -it may result in an increase in proÞts and prices. 3 Therefore, in contrast to ßuctuating demand, changes in the level or volatility of the discount factor have unambiguous effects.
The third difference between the two models lies in the effect that present and future shocks have on collusive prices. In Rotemberg and Saloner's model, a high demand today makes it difficult to support collusion since it offers greater incentives to deviate, while a high demand in future periods makes it easy to collude today given that a future price war becomes a bigger threat. In contrast, in this model both high discount factors today and in the future make it easy to support collusion given that both increase the threat of future punishment.
The different effects that present and future levels of demand have on collusive pricing in Rotemberg and Saloner [22] led to several studies of whether their results were robust to correlation on demand shocks. Kandori [16] Þnds conditions under which demand correlation does not affect the result of countercyclical collusive pricing. Haltiwanger and
Harrington [14] study tacit collusion under deterministic cyclic ßuctuations of demand and Þnd that higher collusive prices can be supported when demand is increasing than when it is decreasing. Bagwell and Staiger [3] study tacit collusion when demand shifts stochastically between high and low growth rates and Þnd that collusive prices are higher for high rates of demand growth if demand growth rates are positively correlated through time.
Under discount factor ßuctuations, the issue of positive correlation is less important than under demand ßuctuations, given that both high discount factors today and in the future increase today's collusive prices. However, I show that the discount factor volatility may be important in understanding how more general discount factor ßuctuations affect the basic results. 3 Rotemberg and Saloner [22] do not provide this comparative static result but straightforward examples can be obtained from their model. In their model the proÞt function may be convex in the ßuctuating parameter so that an increase in volatility increases the expected proÞts and moves up the incentive compatibility constraint.
Customer markets and oligopolistic pricing: There are other environments in which changes in the discount factor may affect oligopoly prices. In models of customer markets, as in Phelps and Winter [19] and Gottfries [13] , and models of competition when consumers have switching costs, as in Klemperer [17] and Chevalier and Scharfstein [8] ,
Þrms face a trade-off between charging high prices to extract the surplus from current customers and charging low prices to attract new customers (whose surplus can be extracted later). In these models an increase in the discount factor increases the incentives to invest in new customers and results in lower prices, as Rotemberg and Woodford's [23] and Klemperer [17] note. In contrast, in the model of tacit collusion presented here, an increase in the discount factor results in higher prices. The higher the discount factor, the stronger the threat of future price wars and the higher the prices that can be supported in equilibrium.
Empirical literature on collusive pricing: Based on the frameworks established by Rotemberg and Saloner [22] or Porter [20] and Green and Porter [12] 4 For a review of empirical studies up to the 1980s see Bresnahan [6] .
is oligopolistic and the other one is perfectly competitive. They show that exogenous shifts in demand towards the oligopolistic sector induce a decrease in collusive prices (since it increases the short run incentives to deviate) and may result in an increase in aggregate production. Rotemberg and Woodford [24] present a real business cycle model with tacitly colluding oligopolistic producers. In their model, an increase in government expenditure raises the short run incentives to deviate and results in a decrease in collusive prices. This, in turn, increases real wages, employment and output. In addition, the authors note that the increase in government expenditure may result in an increase in interest rates (since consumers must postpone consumption), which reinforces the Þrst effect by lowering the threat of future punishments.
In this paper I present another way in which tacit collusion may result in aggregate ßuctuations. Any change in policy, technology or preferences may have an impact on aggregate production through changes in collusive behavior, not only by affecting the real interest rate level, but also by affecting its volatility.
Optimal punishment schemes under quantity competition: Abreu [1] provides a simple stick-and-carrot characterization of optimal symmetric punishments for a Þxed discount factor under quantity competition: "...the most efficient way to provide low payoffs, in terms of incentives to cheat, is to combine a grim present with a credibly rosy future." 5 In this paper I show that the stick-and-carrot characterization extends to the case of discount factor ßuctuations, with both the size of the stick and the size of the carrot depending on the realization of the discount factor.
The level effect and repeated games with Þxed discount factors: It is well known that, for repeated games with Þxed discount factors, the higher the discount factor, the bigger the set of equilibrium outcomes will be (see for example, Abreu, et al. [2] ). In this paper I show that under discount factor ßuctuations it is not only the level of the discount factor that matters, but also its volatility. 5 Abreu [1] , pg. 206.
Price competition
Consider a market with N identical Þrms with a constant marginal cost of c and facing a demand function D(p) (D 0 (p) < 0). Firms compete repeatedly on price and the demand is divided equally among the Þrms charging the lowest price in each period. Firms only care about proÞts and are risk neutral and, hence, their objective is to maximize the discounted stream of proÞts. The distinctive feature of this model is that the discount factor δ t , which discounts earnings from t + 1 to t, is a continuous, independent and identically distributed random variable, between a and b, with p.d.f. f (δ t ) and c.d.f.
The timing of the game in a given period t is as follows: the Þrms observe the realization of the discount factor, δ t , then they choose the price for that period and Þnally they observe the market clearing price, quantities and payoffs. All the characteristics of the environment are common knowledge.
Given that Þrms cannot commit to charge a given price or sign contracts amongst 
Optimal tacit collusion with a random discount factor
It is well known that in repeated oligopoly games, prices above the marginal cost can be supported in equilibrium if any price undercutting triggers future price wars. In the case of price competition, the best price war, in terms of punishment, is the reversion forever to the Bertrand equilibrium after any deviation. This punishment gives a discounted payoff of zero. Any other punishments that would result in a lower payoff are not enforceable given that any Þrm can make sure to earn zero proÞts by charging a price equal to the marginal cost in every period.
Given this punishment, I look for symmetric optimal tacit collusion strategiesstrategies without price differences among Þrms and that in equilibrium support the maximum present value of proÞts. Since the environment in which the Þrms interact does not change over time, with the exception of the discount factor, the optimal tacit collusion solution will consist of the highest equilibrium price that the Þrms can charge in a period given the discount factor in that period. Therefore the solution will consist of a function p
which gives the highest equilibrium price that can be supported for each discount factor. This in turn deÞnes a function π
which denotes the optimal tacit collusion equilibrium proÞts as a function of the period discount factor.
Fortunately, in the search for the optimal tacit collusion behavior it is enough to work with π * (δ). As we see in Figure 1 , a given level of proÞts, for example π 1 , can result from different prices, such as p 1 and p 2 . Given that I am interested in the optimal levels of proÞts that can be supported under tacit collusion and the fact that π 1 may be supported more easily by p 1 than by p 2 , 6 I only consider the increasing part of the proÞt function. In this way, for every proÞt lower than π m corresponds one and only one price lower than p m . Therefore, I can deÞne the function
and once I solve for π * (δ), I can recover p
increasing on π. 6 As it will be clear soon, π 1 can be supported more easily by p 1 than by p 2 since the optimal deviation from p 1 yields N π(p 1 ) which is lower than N π(p m ) which can be obtain deviating from p 2 . 7 For simplicity, I will assume for the rest of the section that φ(π) is differentiable and, hence,
Figure 1: The proÞt function
Given the simplicity of the optimal punishment (reversion to Bertrand) and the fact that we are able to uniquely relate proÞts to prices, I concentrate on the characterization of the equilibrium optimal tacit collusion proÞts π * (δ) without relying on the strategies that result in that equilibrium path. I study next the restriction on collusive proÞts for then characterizing the optimal tacit collusion solution.
Using the recursiveness of the problem, the present value at t of a Þrm stream of proÞts can be written as:
where π(δ t ) denotes the proÞts that the Þrms receive at time t if the discount factor is δ t . Integrating over equation 1 and rearranging we have
where δ is the expected value of δ t . Plugging this into (1), the present value of proÞts can be written as:
Since these Þrms cannot commit to a given price, in equilibrium they must be un-willing to charge a price different from the equilibrium price. How much can a Þrm gain from deviating? If all the Þrms are charging the same price above marginal cost, a single company can decrease its price by a penny and capture the whole market. Therefore, if the equilibrium proÞt is π(δ t ), a single company can gain (N − 1)π(δ t ) by deviating (if we forget about pennies). For Þrms to be unwilling to deviate, punishment must follow a deviation. How much can a Þrm lose from being punished? As described before, the best punishment is to revert forever to the Bertrand equilibrium (the Nash equilibrium of the one stage game). Under this threat if one Þrm deviates it will earn the total industry proÞt the period of deviation but then it will earn zero proÞts forever. Then, for no Þrm to have an incentive to deviate, the following must hold:
In addition, the proÞts per Þrm cannot be greater than under monopoly pricing:
Therefore it is clear that under the optimal symmetric tacit collusion equilibrium Þrms will choose proÞts as large as possible without violating the incentive compatibility constraint (3) and the feasibility constraint (4). 8 Then, dropping the subindexes for simplicity, the optimal tacit collusion proÞts levels π
Note that this equation does not provide the optimal tacit collusion proÞts since π * (δ) appears in both sides of it. Equation (5) is just a necessary condition for optimal tacit 8 It could be argued that that is not necessary since having proÞts lower than possible in a Þnite subset does not affect the expected value. But if we want the solution to be independent of the discount factor of the Þrst period, proÞts must be as high as possible for every possible value of the discount factor.
collusion. In fact, choosing proÞts equal to zero for every discount factor solves this equation. From the possible many solution to equation (5), the one that provides the highest proÞt for each discount factor is the optimal tacit collusion solution: π * (δ). The following proposition fully characterizes the function π * (δ).
Proposition 1
The function π * (δ) depends on f (δ) and N in the following way:
2) if
Proof. Case 1):
and perfect collusion, π * (δ) = π m , can be supported for every discount factor.
Case 2): Consider the case in which the two terms inside the brackets in equation . In this case, integrating over equation (5) and denoting the expected proÞt as A:
In addition, given that for δ = b δ both terms of equation (5) are equal, the expected proÞt can be also written as:
Combining these two equations and by the fact that (integrating by parts) 
It remains to be shown that, under the conditions of case 2), the number b δ that solves equation (6) exists and is unique. Write H(r) = (N − 1)
, it can be easily seen that H(a) = (N − 1) , in which case δ can never be lower than
Proposition 1 shows that, depending on the distribution of the discount factor and the number of Þrms, there are three mutually exclusive cases that result in three different types of optimal tacit collusion. In case 1),
, any possible realization of the discount factor is high enough for each Þrm to value the future monopoly proÞts more than the one stage proÞts of deviation, and, hence, perfect collusion is an equilibrium for any discount factor. On the contrary, in case 3), δ < N−1 N , all the realizations of the discount factor are too low to be able to support any level of collusion. In between these two cases, case 2), perfect collusion can be supported for a range of high realizations of the discount factor while only lower levels of proÞts can be supported for a range of low realizations. The reason for this is that while for low discount factors it is not possible to support full collusion, it may still be possible to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint by reducing the present incentives to deviate. For this, the present proÞts should be lowered so that no Þrm has an incentive to deviate. In this case, an increase in the discount factor results in an increase in the optimal tacit collusion proÞts and, hence, in prices. Given that in the other two cases changes in the discount factor have no effect on proÞts, the next theorem follows. ≥ 0 and dp * (δ) dδ ≥ 0.
9
Note that the characterization of optimal tacit collusion under discount factor ßuc-tuations includes the case of a Þxed discount factor. For the Þxed discount factor case, and no collusion otherwise.
The effects of changes in f(δ)
The characterization of the optimal tacit collusion equilibrium leads to interesting comparative statics results with respect to changes in the distribution function of the discount factor: 1) the higher the probability of high discount factors, the higher the equilibrium prices and proÞts, and 2) the higher the volatility of the discount factor, the lower the equilibrium prices and proÞts.
As an intermediate step to these results, I study Þrst how changes in the distribution function modify the range of perfect collusion under case 2) of Proposition 1. For a cumulative distributions functions F deÞne δ F as the expected discount factor and b δ F as the solution limit to perfect collusion if case 2) applies.
Lemma 3 Consider two cumulative distributions functions, F and G, such that
and F second-order stochastically dominates 10 
By second-order stochastic dominance
Therefore, 9 I omit straightforward proofs. 10 For two cumulative distributions functions F (δ) and G(δ), F second-order stochastic dominates
, and the inequality is strict in some range. In that case, it can be proven that δ F ≥ δ G and
dδ, for any increasing concave twice-piecewise-differentiable function u(δ). See Hirshleifer and Riley [15] . 
Denote π * F (δ), Eπ * F and p * F (δ) as the optimal tacit collusion proÞt, it's expected value and optimal collusion prices under F , respectively. Theorem 4 Consider two cumulative distribution functions, F and G, such that F second-order stochastically dominates G, then π *
Proof. By second-order stochastic dominance δ F ≥ δ G . So, from Proposition 1, we can see that if the solution under F belongs to case 1), the solution under G can belong to any of the three cases. If the solution under F belongs to case 2), the solution under G can belong to cases 2) or 3). And if the solution under F belongs to case 3), the solution under G must belong to the same case. For most of this combinations it is straight forward to see that π * F (δ) ≥ π * G (δ) for every δ. The situation in which both the solution under F as under G belong to case 2) needs more analysis. Since
if the incentive compatibility constraint binds for G but not for F , and π *
is not binding for any of the two. Therefore,
for every δ. The result with respect to prices follows directly from the positive relationship between proÞts and prices.
Note that π * F (δ) is increasing and concave, hence, by second-order stochastic dominance and π *
The intuition of this result becomes clear if we consider two particular cases of second order stochastic dominance: when F Þrst-order stochastically dominates 11 G and when G is a mean preserving spread of F .
From Theorem 2 we know that given a distribution of the discount factor, say G, equilibrium prices and proÞts are increasing in the realization of the discount factor.
Then, a shift in the distribution function to higher values (which yields a cumulative distribution function F that Þrst-order stochastically dominates G), would result in an increase in expected proÞts. This, in turn, increases the threat of future punishments and increases equilibrium prices an proÞts.
From Proposition 1 we know that given a distribution factor, say F , the optimal tacit collusion proÞt function is concave in the discount factor. Therefore, a mean preserving spread (which yields G), would result in a reduction in expected proÞts. This, in turn, reduces the threat of future punishment and results in lower equilibrium prices and proÞts.
Corollary 6 If G is a mean preserving spread of F , then π *
Therefore, the volatility of the discount factor is inversely related to the Þrms' proÞts.
This result might seem somewhat counterintuitive given that the Þrms are risk neutral, but the intuition is in fact simple. The combination of the incentive compatibility constraint with the feasibility constraint yields a proÞt function which is concave in the 11 For two cumulative distributions functions F (δ) and G(δ), F Þrst-order stochastic dominates G if for all r, a ≤ r ≤ b, F (r) ≤ G(r), and the inequality is strict in some range. In that case, it can be proven that F second-order stochastic dominates G and
dδ, for any increasing piecewise differential function u(δ). See Hirshleifer and Riley [15] . discount factor even when Þrms are risk neutral. Hence, an increase in volatility reduces expected proÞts reducing the threat of future punishment and lowering equilibrium prices and proÞts.
Note that this result does not depend on the Þrms not having access to insurance against discount factor ßuctuations. Even if they could buy actuarially fair insurance, an increase in the volatility of the discount factor would reduce the pre-insurance expectation of proÞts and, hence, the Þxed amount that a Þrm could earn with insurance.
In addition, the assumption that the Þrm wants to maximize the present value of proÞts is not crucial for this result. It is usually assumed that managers behave as risk neutral and maximize the present value of proÞts even if they are risk averse because in simple environments this results in the largest budget set possible. This may not hold under interest rate ßuctuations. But if it is not optimal for risk averse managers to behave as risk neutral, then the negative effect of volatility on collusive proÞts can only increase.
The effects of changes in the number of Þrms
With N Þrms in the market a single Þrm may steal a fraction N−1 N of the market by undercutting the price. Since this fraction is increasing in the number of Þrms, the higher the number of Þrms the higher is the present proÞt from deviation for a given proÞt, and the more difficult it will be to support collusion. In fact, it can be easily seen from Proposition 1 that for any distribution of the discount factor, there is large enough number of Þrms above which it is not possible to support any collusion. 12 DeÞne π * N (δ) 12 It is interesting to note that this result does not depend on Þxing the size of the market while and p * N (δ) as the optimal tacit collusion proÞts and prices for N Þrms. 
Example with uniform distributions
The particular case in which the discount factor is distributed uniformly between a and b, 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1, provides clear examples of the previous results.
In the uniform case, taking into consideration that δ = 
Therefore, in the case of uniform distribution of the discount factor, the level of proÞts Consider the distributions of δ represented in Figure 2 by the points A, B and C (the discount factor is distributed U (0.4, 1), U (0.4, 0.65) and U (0.4, 0.5), respectively).
Each of the points falls in a different region and hence will result in a different tacit collusion solution. The distribution denoted by point A results in perfect collusion, the distribution denoted by point B results in perfect collusion for high discount factors and imperfect collusion of lower discount factors and the distribution denoted by C results in no collusion at all. There are two additional things to note from this example. First, proÞts are (weakly) increasing in the realization of the discount factor, as Theorem 2 proves. While for A and C the tacit collusion proÞts do not depend on the realization of the discount factor, for B increases in realization of the discount factor may result in an increase of proÞts and prices. Second, the "more to the right" the distribution function is, the higher proÞts and prices are. Figure 3 This distribution function has the same expected value but a lower volatility than the distribution function denoted by point B. We can see from Figure 2 that if there are only two Þrms in the market, perfect collusion can be supported at point D, while perfect collusion can only be supported for a range of high discount factors for point B. Figure 4 shows the tacit collusion proÞt functions for these two cases as a percentage of monopoly proÞts per Þrm. Consistent with Corollary 6, Figure 4 shows that a mean preserving spread in the distribution of the discount factor reduces the expected value of proÞts. To make clear that the volatility effect is not a second order effect consider the distributions denoted by point E in Figure 2 , U (0.1, 1). This distribution has a higher expected discount factor than the distribution denoted by point D but it also has a higher volatility. Figure 5 shows that the distribution function with the highest expected discount factor and volatility results in lower collusive proÞts. We see that the greater the number of Þrms, the smaller the set of distribution functions for which some collusion is possible. 
Quantity Competition
In this section I show that, under certain assumptions, the three main results that hold under price competition also hold under quantity competition. Namely, Þrst, the higher the discount factor in a period, the higher the collusive prices and proÞts in that period, second, the higher the probability of high discount factors, the higher the collusive prices and proÞts, and third, the higher the volatility of the discount factor, the lower the collusive prices and proÞts that can be supported in equilibrium.
However, to prove this I have to characterize the optimal punishment scheme, which was not necessary under price competition. This is interesting because I show that, while punishment schemes can be extremely complex under quantity competition, the optimal punishment has a simple stick-and-carrot characterization.
I consider the same model of section 2 with one main difference: Þrms compete on quantities. In addition, and only for the sake of generality, I also assume that Þrms have a continuous and differentiable cost function c(q) instead of the linear cost of section 2.
As in section 2, I restrict my attention to symmetric equilibria: all the Þrms produce at a given period the same quantity q. In this symmetric case, I can write the proÞts of each Þrm as π(q) = P (Nq) q − c(q) and total industry proÞts as Π(δ) = N π(q). I assume that there exists a quantity q m that maximizes the total industry proÞts, that is the perfect collusion quantity (q m would be the Nth part of a monopolist optimal production if there are no Þxed cost per factory and increasing returns to scale). Denote π m = π(q m ) as the perfect collusion proÞt per Þrm.
Optimal tacit collusion with a random discount factor
In the case of quantity competition the Cournot reversion is not necessarily the best available punishment since it may be possible to generate subgame perfect threats that lower the proÞts below the Cournot level. Therefore, to characterize the optimal tacit collusion solution it is also necessary to deÞne the optimal punishment scheme. In this section I characterize the optimal equilibrium punishment and collusion under certain assumptions. The Þrst assumption is that there exists a symmetric Cournot equilibrium.
Assumption 1:
There exists a quantity q c that is the unique symmetric Cournot equilibrium.
In this equilibrium each Þrm earns a proÞt of π c and it can be proven that π m > π c , and q m < q c .
The second assumption concerns the proÞts from deviation. In the case of quantity are decreasing with the former having a bigger slope than the latter, in absolute terms, for quantities below q c while the opposite occurs for quantities above q c .
These assumptions are valid, for example, in a market with a linear demand function and constant marginal cost. In addition, in the linear case there is a unique quantity that maximizes industry proÞts (q m ) and a unique and symmetric Cournot equilibrium (q c ). Hence there is no contradiction between the assumptions made in this section. 13 As in section 2, the optimal symmetric tacit collusion equilibrium can be characterized by the maximum level of proÞts per Þrm that can be supported for each discount factor, which I denote π
, abusing notation from section 2. Since assumption 2 ensures that there is a one to one relationship between proÞts and quantities produced in the relevant range, once π * (δ) is obtained, the optimal tacit collusion quantities q
From the demand function we can obtain the optimal tacit collusion proÞts p * (δ) = P (Nq * (δ)).
14 13 In addition, these assumptions, as the assumption presented in the next subsection, could be obtained from assumptions regarding the demand and cost functions. Since those assumptions would be only sufficient ones and would not provide a better intuition I prefer to present conditions regarding π(q) and π d (q) that yield the desired results. 14 Note that this functions denote equilibrium outcomes and not strategies. The supporting strategies As in section 2, I use the recursiveness of the problem to write the present value of proÞts:
In addition, the feasibility condition can be written as:
The incentive compatibility constraint differs from that in the previous section since neither the short run incentives to deviate nor the future punishments are the same.
Under price competition, a Þrm can capture the whole market by a small price deviation, obtaining (N − 1)π(δ) in proÞts from deviation. Under quantity competition, the maximum proÞt from deviation is π d (q (π(δ))) − π(δ), where q(π) is the quantity that every Þrm has to produce to get a per Þrm proÞt of π. In addition, the possible punishment from deviation may not be the same as in price competition. In price competition reverting to a situation of zero proÞts is a credible threat, since that is the Bertrand equilibrium. Instead, under quantity competition a punishment of zero proÞts forever may not be credible. What is credible depends on the biggest credible threat. This threat would consists of punishing the deviator with the lowest equilibrium discounted payoff, denoted by V (δ), while rewarding compliance with the equilibrium with the highest equilibrium discounted payoff, denoted by V (δ), if tomorrows discount factor is δ. Assume for now that the extreme discounted equilibrium payoff functions V (δ) and V (δ) exist, as it is proven later, and deÞne their expected values as EV and EV , respectively. Therefore, for π(δ) to be incentive compatible, it must be the case that no player has incentives to deviate if conforming is rewarded with the highest possible expected continuation payoff EV and deviating is punished with the lowest possible expected continuation payoff EV :
are not explicitly deÞned due to their lack of peculiarities.
For simplicity, write the left hand side of equation (9) as Φ(π(δ)) and denote EV −EV on the right hand side of the equation as B. As such, for a given B, the incentive compatibility constraint can be written as
Note that Φ(π c ) = 0 and that Φ(π) increases as π separates from π c . Then, for a given amount of threat δB,there is a highest and lowest amount of proÞt that can be supported. Next I characterize the incentive compatible upper bound to proÞts, and its interaction with the feasibility constraint, and then characterize the incentive compatible lower bound to proÞts. Proof. In Appendix.
Therefore, for low discount factors the maximum level of proÞts that can be supported is bounded by the incentive compatible upper bound, while for high values it is bounded by the feasibility constraint. Combining both we have the IC + -F constraint:
In the optimal symmetric tacit collusion equilibrium, Þrms will choose proÞts as large as possible given the incentive compatible upper bound and the feasibility constraint.
In addition, given that conforming with the equilibrium strategy must be rewarded with the highest equilibrium payoff, the highest equilibrium discounted payoff V (δ) has a simple relationship with the optimal tacit collusion solution. If π * (δ) is the optimal tacit collusion proÞt function, then
. Therefore, given the lowest expected equilibrium payoff EV , the optimal tacit collusion solution is subject to the following equation:
The following lemma characterizes the incentive compatible lower bound to proÞts. Proof. In Appendix.
Having characterized the incentive compatible lower bound to proÞts, I must still characterize the lower discounted continuation payoff V (δ). I show that the optimal punishment scheme, which yields V (δ), has a simple stick-and-carrot characterization (the punishment takes only one period and is as big as possible in equilibrium), extending the results of Abreu [1] from the Þxed discount factor case.
Lemma 12 Given Eπ * and EV , the lowest equilibrium payoff function is V (δ) =
Proof. Consider any punishment scheme consisting of a proÞt of e π(δ) in the Þrst period and an expected continuation payoff of E e V . DeÞne the present value of the game in that case as e V (δ) = e π(δ) + δE e V . For this punishment scheme to be credible it must be the case that e V (δ) ≥ π d (q(e π(δ))) + δEV . Choose now the Þrst payoff of a two phase punishment π 0 (δ) so that π 0 (δ) +
) + δEV and the two phase punishment is credible. Therefore any equilibrium punishment can be matched with a two phase punishment that yields the best continuation payoff in the second phase.
Then, choosing the lowest equilibrium present payoff, I obtain the lowest equilibrium discounted payoff for a given discount factor, and
Therefore, given the optimal tacit collusion solution, the lowest possible continuation payoffs are subject to the following equation:
The solution to the problem of Þnding the optimal tacit collusion proÞts and the optimal punishment that support that collusion consists of Þnding the functions π * (δ)
and V (δ) that solve equations (12) and (13) is unique.
Proof. Taking the expected value over (12), for any possible solution π(δ) it has to hold that:
In the same way, taking the expected value over (13), for any possible solution V (δ) it has to hold that:
Note that there is a one to one relationship between the proÞt functions that satisfy equation (12) and the expected values that satisfy equation (14) . That is, if π * (δ) satisÞes equation (12), then Eπ * must satisfy equation (14), and if the value Eπ * satisÞes equation (14), π * (δ) satisÞes equation (12) with Eπ * in the right hand side. The same is true for equations (13) and (15) . Therefore, we can Þnd π * (δ) and V (δ) by choosing the solution to equations (14) and (15) with the highest Eπ * . Note that Eπ * = π c and
solve the pair of equations and, hence, there is at least one solution. Let and F (.) are continuous, H(r, s) is also a continuous function. Then, the set of numbers that make H(r, s) = (0, 0) is closed, given that the inverse images of closed sets are closed for continuous functions. In addition it must be bounded
. Therefore, the set of solutions is non-empty, closed and bounded. Then, among the solutions there exists one with the highest r that gives (Eπ * , EV ). Plugging this into equations (12) and (13) we obtain π * (δ) and V (δ).
Uniqueness is clear from the fact that there is a one to one relationship between Eπ * and π * (δ).
Optimal tacit collusion must fall in one of the following three cases, depending on which restriction is binding. First, it may be that only the feasibility constraint binds for every discount factor. In this case, the value of the future monopoly proÞts outweighs the proÞts from deviation, and perfect collusion is an equilibrium for any discount factor. Second, it may be possible that the incentive compatibility constraint binds for low discount factors while the feasibility constraint binds for high discount factors. Third, it may be possible that the incentive compatible upper bound to proÞts binds for every value of the discount factor. While in the Þrst case changes in the discount factor do not affect proÞt and prices, in the last two cases, an increase in the discount factor results in an increase in collusive proÞt and prices. The reason for this is that a higher discount factor results in a higher threat of punishment, so that higher proÞts can be achieved without Þrms having incentives to deviate, and the next Theorem follows.
Theorem 14
Under Assumption 1 and 2, dπ * (δ) dδ ≥ 0 and dp * (δ) dδ ≥ 0.
As in section 2, the equilibrium proÞts and prices are increasing in the discount factor.
The effects of changes in f (δ)
In section 2, the comparative static results with respect to the distribution function of the discount factor depend on the optimal tacit collusion proÞt function being increasing and concave. If that is the case, shifts to the left of the distribution function or increments in volatility reduce the expectation of future proÞts and result in lower equilibrium proÞts and prices. Because under quantity competition the level of punishment is not independent of the discount factor, it is not enough to look at the shape of the optimal tacit collusion proÞts to obtain a comparative static result with respect the distribution function. What is important is the shape of the threat of future punishments:
The stick-and-carrot property of the optimal punishment implies that streams of payoffs leading to the highest and lowest discounted equilibrium payoff differ only in the Þrst period. As a result, the threat of future punishment is simply the maximum difference in payoffs that can be supported in equilibrium in one period. Since I have already proved that the upper bound to proÞts is increasing and the lower bound to proÞts is decreasing, it only remains to be shown that the upper bound is concave while the lower bound is convex. The following assumption is a sufficient condition for that. Proof. In Appendix.
From the future threat being increasing and concave in the next period discount factor, the desired comparative static result with respect to the distribution function of the discount factor follows.
Theorem 16
Consider two cumulative distribution functions, F and G, such that F second-order stochastically dominates G, then π *
Proof. Let V j (δ) and V j (δ), j = F, G, be the highest and lowest equilibrium dis-
is increasing and concave by Lemma
the strategies that yield π * G (δ) and V G (δ) under G do not violate the incentive and feasibility constraints under F , by Φ . Therefore π * F (δ) is not an optimal tacit collusion solution under F , which is a contradiction.
The last two results follow from the positive relationship between proÞts and prices and the relationship between F and G, respectively.
The intuition behind this results is simple. Given that the threat of future punishment is increasing and concave in the discount factor, both increases in the probability of low discount factors and increases in its volatility reduce the expected value of the punishment and result in a reduction of collusive proÞts and prices.
The effects of changes in the number of Þrms
In section 2 I showed that under price competition, increases in the number of Þrms increase the incentives to deviate, decreasing equilibrium proÞts. This result may not be valid when Þrms compete on quantities since not only do the incentives to deviate change with the number of Þrms, but so may the threat of future punishment. In fact, the higher the number of Þrms the easier it is to support low proÞts -a consequence of which is that industry Cournot proÞts fall with the number of Þrms-and the higher the threat of punishment for deviation. Therefore, while under price competition it is enough to study the effect of the number of Þrms on the incentives to deviate, this is not sufficient under quantity competition.
While more work is needed to characterize general conditions under which increases in the number of Þrms decrease equilibrium proÞts and prices, the next subsection presents an example of such a situation. and only lower levels of proÞts can be supported for low discount factors. 15 To my knowledge this issue also remains to be solved for the case of a Þxed discount factor. The closest related paper is Brock and Scheinkman [7] which studies the effect of the number of Þrms on tacit collusion for a Þxed discount factor, price competition and an exogenous capacity per Þrm. They
Þnd that changes in the number of Þrms have a non-monotone effect on optimal collusive prices. Note that the capacity is exogenous and the link to quantity competition from Kreps and Scheinkman [18] does not apply. From Figure 9 it is clear that proÞts are increasing in the discount factor. The comparison between the optimal tacit collusion proÞts for points A and C is an example of the result that the higher the probability of high discount factor, the higher collusive proÞts and prices. The comparison between the collusive proÞts for points A and B is an example of the result that the higher the volatility of the discount factor, the lower proÞts and prices.
One can see the limits to the three types of tacit collusion for N = 16 in Figure 8 .
For the distribution function depicted by point A, perfect collusion can be supported if N = 2, but perfect collusion cannot be supported at all -but lower levels of collusion can-for N = 16, therefore, proÞts must be lower in the latter case.
Extensions
In this section I analyze the restrictiveness of the assumption of symmetric equilibria and study some extensions. As an extension, I modify the assumption of independently distributed discount factor in two ways. I consider Þrst deterministic discount factor cycles and show that increasing discount factors make easier to support collusion. Second, I consider the case in which the distribution of tomorrow's discount factor depends on today's value and show that an increase in the discount factor may result in a decrease in equilibrium prices and proÞts (since the increase in the discount factor may lead to an increase in its future volatility). Finally, I study the validity of the three main results of this paper for general repeated games.
Asymmetric equilibrium prices
In this paper I only consider symmetric equilibrium collusive prices and quantities.
This assumption may not be that restrictive given that joint overall proÞts to Þrms are generally higher when all the Þrms charge the same price or produce the same quantity in equilibrium. The existence of asymmetries in Þrms' equilibrium collusive behavior can only reduce prices and total industry proÞts, since it is the incentive compatibility constraint of the less favored Þrm that binds.
In addition, in the case of price competition, this asymmetry effect is strengthened by an intrinsic discontinuity of the Bertrand model. With price competition, if Þrms offer different prices there will be a group of Þrms that will not provide goods to the market and will get zero proÞts. These Þrms will have large incentives to deviate. Thus, under price competition, the impact of even small price asymmetries on the incentive compatibility constraints can be signiÞcant.
Therefore, there is a compelling reason to restrict ourselves to symmetric equilibrium behavior in this paper: it is the equilibria that maximizes the industry's total proÞt.
Introducing asymmetries would reduce the industry's proÞts by increasing the incentives to deviate for those less favored Þrms that get a small share of the market.
16 16 Nevertheless, under quantity competition, it may be useful to allow for asymmetric behavior off the equilibrium path. The optimal punishment schemes characterized in this paper may only be optimal under the restriction of symmetry off the equilibrium path. It is possible that asymmetries during the punishment stage generate bigger punishments and higher symmetric collusion, as it is the case under a Þxed discount factor (Abreu [1] ).
Deterministic discount factor cycles
In this section I consider deterministic discount factor cycles and show that higher collusive prices and proÞts can be supported when the discount factor is increasing. The reason is simple: the higher the future discount factors, the higher future collusive proÞts and the larger the threat of punishment. Hence, the higher the future discount factors, the higher present collusive prices and proÞts, as the next example shows.
Example 17 An increasing discount factor facilitates collusion: For the discount factor cycle {.55, .75, .55, .35}, price competition and two Þrms in the market, the optimal tacit collusion solution is represented in Figure 10 as a percentage of monopoly proÞts. We can see that for δ = 0.55 the optimal tacit collusion is higher when the discount factor is increasing (point A) than when it is decreasing (point B). Therefore, it is easier to support collusion for a given discount factor when the discount factor is increasing. Under cyclical discount factor ßuctuations, both high discount factors today and in the future make it easy to support collusion given that both increase the threat of future price wars. In contrast, Haltiwanger and Harrington [14] Þnd that under cyclical demand ßuctuations, a high demand today makes it difficult to support collusion since it offers high incentives to deviate, while high demand in future periods makes it easy to collude today because it increases the threat of future price wars.
Correlated discount factor and the volatility effect
Given that both a high discount factor today and in the future make it easy to support collusion, allowing for the more realistic case of positively correlated discount factors will not affect the main results. But these results may be modiÞed if changes in today's discount factor affect its future volatility. In this section I present an extension to the basic model to illustrate that an increase in the discount factor does not necessarily lead to higher collusive prices and proÞts if the increase in the discount factor also raises the volatility of future discount factors. When the value of the present discount factor affect the distribution of the future discount factor, the solution to the optimization problem cannot be found easily. Nevertheless, under price competition and a discrete distribution of the discount factor, the problem can be solved as a linear programming problem (see appendix) 17 .
Example 18 Consider the case in which the discount factor can take only three values Solving the linear programming problem we Þnd that the optimal symmetric tacit collusion equilibrium yields proÞts equal to 4.8, 18 and 15.8 for the discount factor being , respectively.
17 Note that this example is not equivalent to an extension to three states of the Bagwell and Staiger [3] model of correlated demand shocks. In that model changes in present demand growth affected collusive prices only through changes in the expectation of future growth rates. In this example, changes in the discount factor affect both expectations of future discount factors and the present valuation of tomorrow's proÞts making the analysis more complicated.
This example shows that an increase in the discount factor, while increasing the expectation of the future discount factor, may still result in a reduction of proÞts and prices. The reason is that not only does the expectation of future discount factors matter, but so does its volatility. In this case, given that future discount factors have higher volatility when δ = 3 4 than when δ = 1 2 , equilibrium proÞts are lower under the former than under the latter.
General normal form games
In this section I study whether the main results of this paper can be extended to general inÞnitely repeated games with discount factor ßuctuations. I consider an inÞnitely repeated simultaneous move game in which the discount factor is independently and identically distributed. As in the rest of this paper, players observe the realization of the discount factor before choosing an action.
In this more general environment the following results regarding discount factor levels can be shown: Þrst, the higher the realization of the discount factor the larger the set of equilibrium outcomes, and second, the higher the probability of high discount factors the larger the set of equilibrium outcomes. 18 In contrast, it is not true that an increase in the volatility of the discount factor always results in a decrease in the set of equilibrium outcomes. The next example shows that an increase in the volatility of the discount factor may increase the set of equilibrium outcomes for some discount factors. This example shows that a mean preserving spread of the discount factor may result in an increase on the expected payoff of the players and an expansion of the set of possible outcomes for some discount factors.
For repeated games in general it is no longer true that increases in the volatility of the discount factor reduce the set of equilibrium outcomes. The reason is that the maximum level of utility, as a function of the discount factor, is not necessarily a concave function (nor is the minimum level of utility necessarily convex). As result, increases in volatility may increase the expected equilibrium utility, increasing the threat of future punishment. This, in turn, increases the set of outcomes that can be supported for each discount factor.
Conclusions
In a repeated oligopoly, I characterized the optimal symmetric collusion under discount factor ßuctuations and found that collusive prices and proÞts increase with both present and future discount factor levels and decrease with discount factor volatility. These results stress the importance that discount factor levels have on repeated games and introduce a new element to the literature: the volatility of the discount factor.
This work has several important implications for future study. While most of the existing empirical literature on collusive pricing has largely ignored the role of the interest rate, this paper suggests that both the level and the volatility of the interest rate are important determinants of collusive pricing. Thus, to be complete, future empirical work should consider these forces.
This paper also has implications for the study of aggregate ßuctuations. I show that any change in policy, preferences or technology may have an impact on the aggregate level of activity through changes in collusive behavior, not only by affecting the real interest rate, but also by affecting its volatility.
Finally, it would be interesting to study extensions of this work to general repeated games. While I show here that volatility reduces the scope for cooperation in repeated oligopolies, I also show that this is not necessarily true for general repeated games.
Determining conditions under which higher volatility reduces the set of equilibrium outcomes for general repeated games remains for future work. From the characterization of V (δ) and equation (12) we know that the shape of π * (δ) depends on the shape of the IC + -F constraint. In the IC range the concavity of the constraint is determined by the sign of matrix, where t ls denotes the probability that the future discount factor is δ s given that today's is δ l . Let V be the column vector of discounted continuation payoffs and Π the column vector of proÞts given the discount factor. DeÞne b T as the matrix for which b t ls = δ l t ls . Then, V = Π + b T V , the incentive compatibility constraint is (N − 1)Π ≤ b T V and the feasibility constraint is Π ≤ π m 1 L , where 1 L is a column vector of ones. Then, the optimal tacit collusion proÞts result from the following problem:
max αΠ subject to:
≤ 0 L and Π ≤ π m 1 L , where α is any non-negative row vector.
